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We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might
give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves
the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior,
including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down
payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find
that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps
because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest
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Access to credit markets is generally considered a hallmark of developed economies. In the United
States, most households appear to have substantial ability to borrow; indeed, the average household
in the United States has over 23,000 dollars in non-mortgage debt alone. Nevertheless, economists
often point to limited borrowing opportunities, or liquidity constraints, to explain anomalous ￿nd-
ings about consumption behavior, labor supply, and the demand for credit. Despite a sizeable
theoretical literature that explains why some borrowers might have trouble obtaining credit even in
competitive markets (e.g., Ja⁄ee and Stiglitz, 1990), there has been relatively little work relating
the consumer behavior indicative of liquidity constraints to the actual functioning of the credit
market.
In this paper, we use unique data from a large auto sales company to study liquidity constraints
and credit market conditions for precisely the population that is most likely to have a di¢ cult
time obtaining credit, those with low incomes and poor credit histories. These consumers, who
typically cannot qualify for regular bank loans, comprise the so-called subprime market. Because
the company we study originates subprime loans, its loan applications and transaction records
provide an unusual window into the consumption and borrowing behavior of households that are
rationed in primary credit markets. Moreover, we track loan repayments allowing us to analyze
the di¢ culties in lending to the subprime population and explain why their supply of credit may
be limited.
We begin by documenting the importance of short-term liquidity constraints for individuals
in our sample. We present two pieces of evidence. Both are based on purchasing behavior and
indicate a high sensitivity to cash-on-hand. First, we document a dramatic degree of demand
seasonality associated with tax rebates. Overall demand is almost 50 percent higher during tax
rebate season than during other parts of the year. This seasonal e⁄ect substantially varies with
household income and with the number of dependents, closely mirroring the federal earned income
tax credit schedule. Second, we ￿nd that demand is highly responsive to changes in minimum
down payment requirements. A 100 dollar increase in the required down payment, holding car
prices ￿xed, reduces demand by 7 percent. In contrast, generating the same reduction in demand
requires an increase in car prices of close to 1,000 dollars. We calculate that in the absence of
liquidity constraints these e⁄ects would imply an annual discount rate of 427 percent.1
1Throughout, we use s to denote the subjective discount rate. A discount rate of 427 percent implies a subjective
1Taken together, these ￿ndings point to the conclusion that this population does not have ready
access to credit that allows them to shift wealth across time. This raises the question of whether
consumer liquidity constraints can be tied to underlying credit market conditions. One possibility
is that high default rates, coupled with legal caps on interest rates, simply rule out some forms
of lending. A second possibility is that fundamental features of the consumer credit market are
responsible for credit constraints. To investigate this possibility, we turn to the information eco-
nomics view of credit markets, as developed by Ja⁄ee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).
Modern information economics emphasizes that credit constraints can arise in equilibrium even
if ￿nancing terms can adjust freely and lenders are fully competitive. Its explanation lies in the
twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the moral hazard version of the story,
individual borrowers are more likely to default on larger loans. This leads to problems in the loan
market because borrowers do not internalize the full increase in default costs that come with larger
loan sizes. As a result, lenders may need to cap loan sizes to prevent over-borrowing. In contrast,
adverse selection problems arise if borrowers at high risk of default also desire large loans, as might
be expected given that they view repayment as less likely. As the theoretical literature has pointed
out, adverse selection can give rise not only to loan caps, but to some worthy borrowers being
denied credit because they cannot distinguish themselves from the less worthy.2
The second half of the paper explores these ideas, ￿rst from the standpoint of theory and then
empirically. In Section 4 we develop a simple model of consumer demand for credit and competitive
lending, along the lines of Ja⁄ee and Russell (1976). We show that such a model can explain many
of the institutional features we observe on the lender side of the market, such as the adoption of
credit scoring and risk-based pricing, and the use of interest rates that increase with loan size.
We also explain why informational problems, compounded by interest rate caps, create a rationale
for lenders to limit access to credit. The model therefore provides a simple credit market based
explanation for why purchasing behavior might re￿ ect liquidity constraints.
Having outlined the theoretical framework, we investigate the empirical importance of moral
hazard and adverse selection for subprime lending. Separately identifying these two forces is often
discount factor, equal to 1=(1 + s), of less than 0:2. Such an individual is indiferent between paying 1,000 dollars
today and 5,270 dollars in a year.
2The fact that imperfect information in the credit market leads to limits on lending is analogous to Rothschild and
Stiglitz￿ s (1976) famous observation that imperfect information in an insurance market may lead to under-insurance
relative to the full-information optimum.
2a challenge because they have similar implications: both moral hazard and adverse selection imply
a positive correlation between loan size and default. A useful feature of our data is that we can
exploit exogenous (to the individual) variation in car price to isolate the pure moral hazard e⁄ect
of increased loan size on default. This in turn allows us to back out a quantitative estimate of
self-selection from the cross-sectional correlation between loan size and default. We explain the
econometric strategy in detail in Section 5.2.
We ￿nd compelling evidence for both moral hazard and adverse selection. We estimate that
for a given borrower, a 1,000 dollar increase in loan size increases the rate of default by over 16
percent. This alone provides a rationale for limiting loan sizes because the expected revenue from
a loan is not monotonically increasing in the size of the loan. Regarding adverse selection, we ￿nd
that borrowers who are observably at high risk of default are precisely the borrowers who desire
the largest loans. The company we study assigns buyers to a small number of credit categories. We
estimate that all else equal, a buyer in the worst category wants to borrow around 200 dollars more
than a buyer in the best category, and is more than twice more likely to default given equally-sized
loans.
This strong force toward adverse selection is mitigated substantially by the use of risk-based
pricing. In practice, observably risky buyers end up with smaller rather than larger loans because
they face higher down payment requirements. The ￿nding is notable because it is often suggested
that the development of sophisticated credit scoring has had a major impact on consumer credit
markets, but there is relatively little empirical evidence on exactly what it accomplishes. Here we
document its marked e⁄ect in matching high-risk borrowers with smaller loans. Of course, risk-
based pricing only mitigates selection across observably di⁄erent risk groups. We also look for,
and ￿nd, evidence of adverse selection within risk groups, driven by unobservable characteristics.
Speci￿cally, we estimate that a buyer who pays an extra 1,000 dollars down for unobservable reasons
will be eight percent less likely to default than one who does not given identical cars and equivalent
loan liabilities. This adverse selection on unobservables is both statistically and economically
signi￿cant, but smaller in magnitude than our estimates of moral hazard.
We view these ￿ndings as broadly supportive of the information economics view of consumer
lending and its explanation for the presence of credit constraints. Overall our evidence supports: (1)
the underlying forces of informational models of lending, namely moral hazard and adverse selection;
(2) the supply-side responses these models predict, speci￿cally loan caps, variable interest rates, and
3risk-based pricing; and (3) the predicted consequences, speci￿cally liquidity e⁄ects in purchasing
behavior. So while there are limits to what we can conclude with data from a single lender, we
think that our results highlight the empirical relevance of informational models of consumer credit
markets.3
Our paper ties into a large empirical literature documenting liquidity-constrained consumer
behavior and a much smaller literature on its causes. Much of the accumulated evidence on the
former comes from consumption studies that document relatively high propensities to consume out
of transitory income, particularly for households with low wealth.4 Some of the sharpest evidence
in this regard comes from analyzing consumption following predictable tax rebates. For instance,
Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) ￿nd that households immediately consumed 20-40 percent of
the 2001 tax rebate, with the e⁄ect biggest for low-wealth households (see also Souleles, 1999, and
Parker, 1999). A common explanation for these ￿ndings is that households with low wealth are
unable to e⁄ectively access credit (Deaton, 1991; Zeldes, 1989).5
Further evidence on credit constraints comes from Gross and Souleles (2001), who use detailed
data from a credit card company to look at what happens when credit limits are raised. They ￿nd
that a hundred dollar increase in a card holder￿ s limit raises spending by ten to fourteen dollars.
Based on this, they argue that a substantial fraction of borrowers in their sample appear to be credit
constrained. As will be apparent below, the population in our data is most likely in a substantially
worse position to access credit than the typical credit card holder.
A distinct set of evidence on credit constraints comes from studying household preferences
over di⁄erent types of loan contracts. An early survey by Juster and Shay (1964) found striking
di⁄erences between households in their willingness to pay higher interest rates for a longer loan with
lower monthly payments. In particular, households likely to be credit constrained, e.g. those with
lower incomes, were much more willing to pay higher interest rates to reduce their monthly payment.
More recently, Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou (2006) use Survey of Consumer Finances data
on auto loans to show that for most households, and particularly for low-income ones, the demand
3Our analysis is positive rather than normative and agnostic about the exact model of consumer behavior, on
which welfare analysis would depend.
4Studies of the e⁄ects of unemployment insurance also provide evidence for credit constraints (e.g., Chetty, 2006;
Card, Chetty and Weber, 2006).
5There is no clear consensus, however, on the exact story. For instance, Carroll (2001) argues that much of the
evidence on consumption behavior can be explained by a bu⁄er stock model where all agents can borrow freely at
relatively low interest rates. Jappelli (1990) provides some limited evidence supporting rationing at a ￿xed interest
rate, based on the fact that nineteen percent of the households in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances report
having had a credit application rejected or not applying for a loan for fear of being rejected.
4for loans is much more sensitive to loan maturity than to interest rate.6 Their interpretation is
that because of their limited access to credit, many consumers will pay a substantial premium to
smooth payments over a longer period.
The purpose of the above studies is to document that a signi￿cant set of households has a
limited ability to borrow at desirable rates. There is much less empirical work that addresses the
causes of credit constraints. Ausubel (1991, 1999) argues that the high interest rates charged by
credit card issuers are a market failure caused by adverse selection, a view that is supported by
direct marketing experiments. Edelberg (2003, 2004) also ￿nds evidence for adverse selection in
both mortgage lending and automobile loans, and documents an increasing trend toward risk-based
interest rates. We view it as a virtue of our data that we can tie together demand-side evidence
for credit constrained behavior with evidence on the informational problems that might give rise
to these constraints. Some of our ongoing work explores more deeply how lenders respond to
informational problems by looking at the introduction of credit scoring and the problem of optimal
loan pricing in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection.
2 Data and Environment
Our data come from an auto sales company that operates used car dealerships in the United States.
Each potential customer ￿lls out a loan application and is assigned a credit category that determines
the possible ￿nancing terms. Almost all buyers ￿nance a large fraction of their purchase with a
loan that extends over a period of several years. What makes the company an unusual window into
consumer borrowing is its customer population. Customers are primarily low-income workers and
a great majority are subprime borrowers. In the U.S., Fair Isaac (FICO) scores are the most-used
measure of creditworthiness. They range from 350 to 800, with the national median between 700
and 750. Less than half of the company￿ s applicants have a FICO score above 500, the second
percentile of the national FICO score distribution. This kind of low credit score indicates either a
sparse or, more often, checkered credit record.
The principal characteristics of subprime lending are high interest rates and high default rates.
A typical loan in our data has an annual interest rate on the order of 25-30 percent. The ￿ ip side
6Karlan and Zinman (2006a) report a similar ￿nding, that loan demand is more sensitive to maturity than to
interest rate, based on a pricing experiment carried out by a South African lender. Their experiment also provides
some evidence for moral hazard and adverse selection (Karlan and Zinman, 2006b).
5of high interest rates is high default rates. Over half of the company￿ s loans end in default. With
such a high probability of default, screening the good risks from the bad, and monitoring loan
payments, is extremely important. The company has invested signi￿cantly in proprietary credit
scoring technology.
Having described the institutional setting, we now turn to our speci￿c data. We have company
data on all applications and sales from June 2001 through December 2004. We combined this with
records of loan payments, defaults and recoveries through April 2006. This gives us information
on the characteristics of potential customers, the terms of the consummated transactions, and the
resulting loan outcomes. We have additional data on the loan terms being o⁄ered at any given
time as a function of credit score, and inventory data that allows us to observe the acquisition cost
of each car, the amount spent to recondition it, and its list price on the lot.
The top panel of Table 1 contains summary statistics on the applicant population. There are
well over 50,000 applications in our sample period (to preserve con￿dentiality, we do not report
the exact number of applications). The median applicant is in his or her mid-thirties and has a
monthly household income of 2,411 dollars. We do not have a direct measure of household assets or
debt, but we observe a variety of indirect measures. A small fraction of applicants are homeowners,
but the majority are renters and more live with their parents than own their own home. Nearly a
third report having neither a savings nor a checking account. The typical credit history is spotty:
more than half of the applicants have had a delinquent balance within six months prior to their
loan application. In short, these applicants represent a segment of the population for whom access
to credit is potentially problematic.
Just over one third of the applicants purchase a car. The average buyer has a somewhat
higher income and somewhat better credit characteristics than the average applicant. In particular,
the company assigns each applicant a credit category, which we partition into ￿high￿ , ￿medium￿
and ￿low￿ risk. The applicant pool is 26 percent low risk and 29 percent high risk, while the
corresponding percentages for the pool of buyers are 35 and 17.
The sales terms, summarized in the second panel of Table 1, re￿ ect the presumably limited
options of this population. A typical car, and most are around 3-5 years old, costs around 6,000
dollars to bring to the lot. The average sale price is just under 11,000 dollars.7 The average down
7Car prices are subject to some degree of negotiation, which we discuss in Section 3. The price we report here is
the negotiated transaction price rather than the ￿list￿price, which is slightly higher.
6payment is a bit less than 1000 dollars, so after taxes and fees, the average loan size is similar to
the sales price.
Despite the large loans and small down payments, it appears that many buyers would prefer to
put down even less money. Forty-four percent make exactly the minimum down payment, which
varies with the buyer￿ s credit category but is typically between 400 and 1,000 dollars. Some buyers
do make down payments that are substantially above the required minimum, but the number is
small. Less than ten percent of buyers make down payments that exceed the required down payment
by a thousand dollars.
In a ￿nanced purchase, the monthly payment depends on the sale price, the interest rate and the
loan term.8 Much of the relevant variation in our data is due to the former rather than the latter.
Over eighty-￿ve percent of the loans have an annual interest rate over 20 percent, and around half
the loans appear to be at the state-mandated maximum annual interest rate.9 Most states in our
data have a uniform 30 percent cap.10 These rates mean that ￿nance charges are signi￿cant. For
instance, a borrower who takes an 11,000 dollar loan at a 30 percent APR and repays it over 42
months will make interest payments totalling 6,000 dollars.
The main reason for the high ￿nance charges is evident in the third panel of Table 1. Most loans
end in default. Our data ends before the last payments are due on some loans, but of the loans with
uncensored payment periods, only 39 percent are repaid in full.11 Moreover, loans that do default
tend to default quickly. Figure 1(a) plots a kernel density of the fraction of payments made by
borrowers who defaulted. Nearly half the defaults occur before a quarter of the payments have been
made, that is, within ten months. This leads to a highly bimodal distribution of per-sale pro￿ts. To
capture this, we calculated the present value of payments received for each uncensored loan in our
data, including both the down payment and the amount recovered in the event of default, using an
annual interest rate of 10 percent to value the payment stream. We then divide this by the ￿rm￿ s
reported costs of purchasing and reconditioning the car to obtain a rate of return on capital for
8Letting p denote the car price, d the down payment, T the loan term in months and R = 1 + r the monthly
interest rate, the monthly payment is given by m = (p ￿ d) ￿ (R ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ R
￿T).
9The company does o⁄er lower rates to some buyers who have either particularly good credit records or make
down payments above the minimum. Although we do not have direct data on the o⁄ers of competing lenders, it
seems unlikely that this population has access to better rates. Fair Isaac￿ s web page indicates that borrowers with
FICO scores in the 500-600 range (that is, better than the majority of the applicants in our sample) should expect to
pay close to 20 percent annual interest for standard used car loans in most states, and in some states will not qualify
at all for ￿standard￿loans.
10A few states have lower caps that depend on characteristics of the car.
11We have limited data on the causes of default. The company reports that most defaults are triggered by personal
problems such as job loss. Car accidents or breakdowns can also trigger a default.
7each transaction. Figure 1(b) plots the distribution of returns, showing the clear bimodal pattern.
It is also interesting to isolate the value of each stream of loan repayments and compare it to the
size of each loan. When we do this for each uncensored loan in our data (and use annual discount
rates of 0 to 10 percent), we ￿nd an average repayment to loan ratio of 0.72-0.82. Moreover, a
substantial majority of loans in the data, 58-62 percent, have a repayment to loan ratio below one.
This calculation provides a simple explanation for why a large fraction of buyers would maximize
their loan size. In the majority of cases, the present value of payments on an extra dollar borrowed
is signi￿cantly less than a dollar paid up front.12
3 Evidence of Liquidity Constraints: Purchasing Behavior
A consumer is liquidity constrained if he cannot ￿nance present purchases using resources that
will accrue to him in the future. Subprime borrowers are obvious candidates to ￿nd themselves
in this position. While we cannot directly observe individual household balance sheets and credit
options, our data does permit us to investigate the behavioral implications of liquidity constraints.
We consider two such implications in this section.
The ￿rst concerns purchasing sensitivity with respect to current and predictable future cash
￿ ow. For an individual who can borrow freely against future resources, the response should be
equal. In contrast, a high purchase response to a predictable temporary spike in cash ￿ ow, such as
a tax rebate, suggests an inability to shift resources over time. The ￿rst piece of evidence we present
is a striking seasonal increase in applications and sales at precisely tax rebate time. Moreover, we
show that there is a remarkably clear correlation between the seasonal e⁄ects we observe and the
amount of the earned income tax credit, which is likely to be a signi￿cant portion of the tax rebate
for many households in our data.
The second empirical implication is the mirror image of the ￿rst. An individual who is not
liquidity constrained should evaluate the cost of a given payment schedule based on its present
value. In contrast, a liquidity constrained individual values the opportunity to defer payments to
the future, and therefore views current payments as more costly than the present value of future
12Our calculations are most informative for small changes in loan size. As we show below, smaller loans decrease the
probability of default, which generates a non-convexity in loan demand. This e⁄ect is not re￿ ected in our calculation,
which takes the default process as ￿xed. It is also worth noting that the incentive to borrow on the margin increases
with buyers￿subjective discount rates. Some researchers (e.g., Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 2003) have argued
that borrowing behavior re￿ ects a much higher degree of impatience than we assume here.
8payments. This is consistent with the second piece of evidence we present: individuals￿purchase
elasticity with respect to current payment (down payment) is an order of magnitude higher than
with respect to future payments.
Can we rationalize these ￿ndings in the absence of borrowing constraints? Explaining our
seasonality ￿nding is di¢ cult. It seems unlikely that members of the population we study have
a particular need for cars in the month of February. An alternative is that consumers view their
purchase as a form of savings rather than consumption. But given the price margins and very low
down payments, the immediate post-purchase equity share is negligible.13 Moreover, given the high
default rate, viewing the transaction as a form of saving seems implausible unless consumers are
greatly over-optimistic about their likelihood of making payments, which in turn would make it
even harder to rationalize our second ￿nding.
If consumers are realistic about the possibility of default, our second ￿nding can be explained
without reference to borrowing constraints if individuals highly discount the future. In particular,
we calculate that our estimated purchase sensitivity with respect to present and future payments is
consistent with consumers equating a 1,000 dollar cost today with a 5,270 dollar cost in one year.
This number will only be higher if consumers were over optimistic about their default behavior
and viewed their car purchase as a form of saving. For this reason, we view the combination of our
two ￿ndings as particularly convincing evidence that liquidity plays a key role in driving consumer
purchasing behavior.
3.1 The E⁄ect of Tax Rebate Season
We start by examining seasonal patterns in demand. Figure 2(a) displays the average number of
applications and sales, by calendar week, over the 2002-2005 period. Both are markedly higher
from late January to early March. Applications are 23 percent higher in February than in the other
months, and the close rate (sales to applications ratio) is 40 percent compared to 33 percent over
the rest of the year. These seasonal patterns cannot be attributed to sales or other changes in the
￿rm￿ s o⁄ers. In fact, required down payments are almost 150 dollars higher in February, averaging
across applicants in our data, than in the other months of the year. Indeed we initially thought
these patterns indicated a data problem until the company pointed out that prospective buyers
13This would not be the case for a non-￿nanced car purchase, which is presumably the reason that studies of the
marginal propensity to consume out of tax rebates focus on expenditure on non-durables.
9receive their tax rebates at precisely this time of year.
But can tax rebates be large enough to explain such a dramatic spike in demand? All loan
applicants must hold a job to be eligible for a loan, and most are relatively low earners, making
them eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC). The associated rebate, which varies with
income and the number of dependents, can be as high as 4,500 dollars. To assess whether purchasing
patterns might re￿ ect EITC rebates, we classi￿ed applicants into twelve groups depending on their
monthly household income and their number of dependents. For each group, we calculated the
earned income tax credit for the average household in the group,14 and also the percent increase
in applications, close rate and sales in February relative to the other months. Figure 2(b) plots
the relationship between the calculated EITC rebate and the seasonal spike in demand for each
group. There is a sharp correlation. For households with monthly incomes below 1,500 dollars and
at least two dependents, for whom the EITC rebate could be around 4,000 dollars, the number
of applications doubles in February and the number of purchases more than triples. In contrast,
for households with monthly incomes above 3,500 dollars and no dependents, for whom the EITC
rebate is likely zero, the number of applications and purchases exhibits virtually no increase in tax
rebate season.
Because minimum down payment requirements are raised during tax season, it is interesting
to isolate the seasonal e⁄ect in demand holding all else constant. Our demand estimates in the
next section, which control for the relevant o⁄er terms as well as individual characteristics such
as credit score and household income, indicate that the demand of applicants who arrive on the
lot is 30 percent higher in the month of February than in other months. There are also positive
but less pronounced demand e⁄ects for January and March. Consistent with the liquidity story,
we also ￿nd that the seasonal pattern reported above is mainly driven by cash transactions, while
purchases that involve trade-ins, which are less likely to be a⁄ected by tax rebates, do not exhibit
noticeable seasonal variation.
Our estimates of loan demand, discussed in Section 5, are also consistent with the hypothesis
that tax rebates represent a substantial liquidity shock that signi￿cantly a⁄ects behavior. In par-
ticular, down payments are substantially higher in tax season even after factoring in the higher
minimum requirements. About 65 percent of February purchasers make a down payment above the
14The details of the EITC schedule did not change much over our observation period (2001-2005). The particular
numbers we report are based on the the 2003 schedule.
10required (higher) minimum compared to 54 percent in the rest of the year. Moreover, we estimate
that after controlling for transaction characteristics the desired down payment of a February buyer
is about 300 dollar higher than that of the average buyer. This is an enormous e⁄ect given that
the average down payment is under 1,000 dollars.
3.2 Estimating Purchasing Demand
Additional evidence on the role of short-term liquidity in purchasing comes from looking at the
responsiveness of demand to changes in di⁄erent components of the car/￿nancing package. To study
this, we use our data on applications and purchases to estimate a model of consumer demand.
Speci￿cally, we consider a probit model for the purchase decision, estimated at the level of the
individual applicant. Let qi denote a dummy variable equal to one if applicant i purchases a car.
We assume that
qi = 1 , q￿
i = x0
i￿ + "i ￿ 0; (1)
where each xi = (xo
i;xc
i;xa
i) is a vector of transaction characteristics for applicant i and "i is an
i.i.d normally-distributed error term. Here, xo
i denotes the o⁄er characteristics: car price, baseline
interest rate, loan term and minimum down payment. The vector xc
i denotes car characteristics
including the car￿ s acquisition cost, the amount spent on reconditioning the car, the mileage, car
age and, as a useful proxy for any unobserved quality, the time the car has spent on the lot. Finally,
xa
i denotes applicant characteristics including the applicant￿ s credit category and monthly income,
as well as city, month and year dummies.
Before discussing our estimates, several points deserve attention. The ￿rst is our use of
individual-level data. The use of individual level data to estimate demand, particularly for unique
goods such as used cars, is vastly preferable to the use of aggregate data. To take advantage of
this, however, we have to address a missing data problem. We observe applicant characteristics for
non-purchasers, but not the car and o⁄er they considered. Our solution is imputation. For each
non-purchaser, we randomly select a purchaser with the same credit category in the same city and
week, and assume the non-purchaser faced the same car and price.15
15An obvious concern with this imputation is identifying the e⁄ect of price changes. Because prices are individually
negotiated, it seems plausible that non-purchasers might have faced somewhat higher prices. Even if the di⁄erence
in o⁄ers arises for random exogenous reasons, a straight demand regression would underestimate the e⁄ect of price
changes. We address this problem, as well as the concern that negotiated prices may incorporate information not
available to us as analysts, with the instrumental variables strategy described below.
11The second point is our decision to model purchasing as an up or down decision made after the
consumer arrives on the lot. By considering only the pool of applicants, we neglect the possibility
that pricing might a⁄ect applications. By focusing on an up or down decision, we neglect the
possibility that consumers might choose among cars taking into account all of their prices.16 Both
concerns are mitigated by the fact that prices are negotiated at the individual level and often no
price is listed on the car. Therefore, it seems reasonable to model consumers as learning what
speci￿c terms apply only after they arrive on the lot and ￿ll in the loan application (and, by that,
enter our data). Once an application is ￿lled, a credit category is obtained, and the associated o⁄er
terms guide the salesperson as to which car to show the applicant. This modelling approach has
the additional bene￿t of greatly simplifying demand estimation.
The third point concerns identi￿cation. From the company￿ s perspective, the central decision
variables are car prices and required down payments. To identify their e⁄ect on purchasing, we
need to understand how they are set and why they vary in the data. The typical concern here
is endogeneity ￿ the ￿rm￿ s pricing choices may re￿ ect information about demand that is not
available in the data. In our case, we observe the same information as company headquarters
so we feel comfortable making the assumption that with su¢ cient controls decisions made at the
company level are exogenous to individual applicants, i.e. uncorrelated with unobservable individual
characteristics (the "i￿ s).
Minimum down payments indeed are set at the company level. There are separate requirements
for each credit category, with some regional adjustment, and these requirements are adjusted pe-
riodically. Moreover, because minimum payment requirements are set for groups, two identical
(or near-identical) applicants can face di⁄erent down payment requirements due to variation in the
characteristics of other applicants in their pool. Our data, therefore, contain three sources of identi-
fying variation in minimum down payments: variation over time, variation across credit categories,
and regional variation. In our baseline speci￿cation, we include city and category dummies, mean-
ing that we focus on changes over time and on di⁄erential changes across categories and regions.
We have also performed a wide range of robustness checks where we separately isolate each source
of variation in the data, for instance by focusing on short time windows around a price change,
or by focusing on applicants whose credit scores place them on the margin between two adjacent
16If this were the case, we would still obtain accurate estimates of the e⁄ect of a change in price on latent utility,
but we would not be able to extrapolate from this to a change in the ￿rm￿ s overall sales.
12credit categories. The results show that the estimated coe¢ cient on minimum down payment is
remarkably stable across alternative speci￿cations.17
Identifying the demand response to changes in car prices is more di¢ cult because the actual
transaction price is negotiated individually. Individual salespeople start with a ￿list￿ price for
each car, that is set centrally, but may incorporate further information into the negotiation. This
additional information creates a possible endogeneity problem. Our solution is to use the centrally
set list price as an instrument for the negotiated price. The list price derives from a mechanical
formula used to mark prices up over cost. We again have three separate sources of identifying
variation in the mark-up formula. The ￿rst is variation over time (we observe one large and
one small change in the formula); the second is regional variation, which is substantial; the third
arises from the fact that margins are di⁄erent for di⁄erent priced cars and the formula is highly
discontinuous. Our baseline speci￿cation contains city dummies, so it combines the time variation,
the non-linearity of the mark-up formula and di⁄erential changes across region. As with minimum
down payment, we performed a wide range of robustness checks, separately isolating each source of
variation. The estimated coe¢ cient on price is less stable than that on minimum down payment,
but all of our conclusions are highly robust across speci￿cations.
3.3 Purchase Demand and Liquidity
Table 2 reports our demand estimates. The three speci￿cations vary only in their treatment of car
price. The ￿rst two columns contain ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimates of
the e⁄ect of negotiated price on the purchase decision. The third column reports the e⁄ect of the
company￿ s list price on demand. We focus on the second column, which most naturally captures
the decisions made by individual applicants. The speci￿cation of the third column more closely
resembles work on automobile demand in which attention is devoted to the suggested retail price,
ignoring individual price negotiations.
In addition to the o⁄er terms, our demand speci￿cation includes detailed buyer and car charac-
teristics, including dealer, month and year dummies. Because the realized interest rate can depend
on the size of the down payment, we do not include it as part of the o⁄er. Instead, we include
the interest rate that the buyer would have paid if they made the minimum down payment. As an
17An Appendix showing the results from a wide range of alternative samples and speci￿cations is available on
request from the authors.
13empirical matter, the di⁄erences are relatively small (see later), and using the realized interest rate
has no e⁄ect on the other coe¢ cients.
Our main interest is the e⁄ect of car price and minimum down payment on purchasing decisions.
Changes in these o⁄er terms are not identical from a buyer￿ s perspective. The down payment is
made immediately as a lump-sum, while changes in car price can be spread over time (as we
will see below, changes in car price in fact translate almost one-for-one into larger loans rather
than larger down payments). As a result, an applicant who is relatively impatient or liquidity
constrained should be more sensitive to changes in the down payment, holding the loan amount
￿xed. Moreover, the high probability of default means that a purchaser often will not bear the full
cost of a price increase. This should also reduce the sensitivity of demand to car price relative to
the down payment requirement. At the same time, a higher down payment holding car price ￿xed
implies a smaller loan, weakening the e⁄ect of a change in the required down payment.
Despite these various forces, it is still straightforward to look for evidence of liquidity constraints.
If applicants are not liquidity constrained, they care about the present value of future payments.
For a purchaser who agrees to a price p, makes a down payment D, and borrows the balance at a
monthly interest rate r over a T-month term, the expected payment is
E[Payment] = D + (p ￿ D) ￿
PT
t=1 (1 + s)
￿t St
PT
t=1 (1 + r)
￿t = D + (p ￿ D)￿, (2)
where s is the purchaser￿ s subjective monthly discount rate and St is the probability that the loan
will not be in default before the end of month t.
The value ￿ represents the expected present value of payment that will be made for each dollar
that is borrowed. It is exactly analogous to the repayment to loan ratio introduced in Section 2,
the di⁄erence being that the relevant rate of discount is the customer￿ s rather than the ￿rm￿ s. To
construct a plausible estimate of ￿, therefore, we again calculate the average repayment to loan ratio
for uncensored loans in the data using a broader range of discount rates.18 Using this approach, an
applicant who is not liquidity constrained, plans to make the minimum down payment and has an
annual discount rate of 5 percent should view a one hundred dollar increase in the required down
payment as equivalent to a 30 dollar increase in the car price. If the agent is more impatient, a
18One could potentially be more sophisticated here and, for instance, account for changes in loan size a⁄ecting the
default process, or di⁄erences between marginal applicants and the broader distribution of buyers. We think that our
approach is a good enough approximation for the task at hand, however.
14down payment increase matters more. For annual discount rates of 10, 20 and 50 percent, the agent
views a 100 dollar increase in the down payment as equivalent to 38, 55 and 108 dollar increases in
the car price.
Our demand estimates, however, imply that applicants are far more sensitive to minimum down
payment requirements than these calculations would suggest. We estimate that a 100 dollar increase
in the minimum down payment reduces the probability that an applicant will purchase by 0.0301,
while a 100 dollar increase in the car price reduces the purchase probability by only 0.0034. That
is, a 100 dollar increase in the minimum down payment has the same e⁄ect as a 900 dollar increase
in car price. This can still be explained in the absence of liquidity constraints, but it requires a
much higher annual discount rate of 427 percent.
These calculations focus on the relative sensitivity of demand to car price and minimum down
payment. The absolute sensitivity to minimum down payment is itself large. Our estimate implies
that a 100 dollar increase in the minimum down payment reduces sales by nine percent. This
number appears to be consistent with the company￿ s own view of pricing responsiveness, but it
is still notable given that subsequent monthly payments are on average 400 dollars. This, too,
suggests that applicants face a high cost of coming up with extra cash.
Table 2 also reports estimates of how buyer and car characteristics a⁄ect demand. As might be
expected, conditional on price, cars that cost more, have lower mileage, and have spent less time on
the lot, are more likely to sell. Similarly, applicants with higher incomes, and with bank accounts,
are more likely to purchase. Both e⁄ects make particular sense from a liquidity standpoint; these
applicants are likely to have greater resources to make a down payment. A somewhat surprising
result is that a buyer￿ s credit category does not systematically in￿ uence the probability of purchase.
One possible explanation is that although lower risk buyers may have greater resources and access
to immediate cash, they also have better alternatives. Our ￿nding that applicants who own their
own homes are less likely to buy than renters is consistent with this hypothesis.
4 Information Asymmetries and Liquidity Constraints: Theory
In this section, we develop a simple credit market model along the lines of Ja⁄ee and Russell (1976),
and show how moral hazard and adverse selection can lead to credit constraints being imposed in
equilibrium. We also explain the e⁄ect of interest rate caps and how risk-based pricing mitigates
15adverse selection. The theory developed in this section will guide our empirical analysis in the
next section. Because the basic ideas are familiar from the general theory of credit and insurance
markets, we con￿ne ourselves to a largely graphical analysis.
We consider a two-period model with a large number of ￿rms and consumers. We assume that
￿rms are integrated and the sales and ￿nance market is perfectly competitive. Neither assumption is
essential for the points we make. To begin, we also assume that customers are ex ante homogenous
although we will relax this below.
In the ￿rst period, each consumer decides whether or not to buy a car, and if so, how large a
loan to take. In the second period, the consumer decides whether or not to repay the loan. For
expositional purposes, it is useful to think of a contract between a consumer and a ￿rm as specifying
a ￿rst period down payment D, equal to the price p minus the loan size L, and a second period
payment M. The second period payment will equal to the loan size L times the contractual interest
rate R. The borrower may or may not repay the loan. We make the natural assumption that the
probability of repayment ￿(M) is decreasing in loan liability M.19 In other words, there is a moral
hazard problem in repayment.20
Let U(D;M) denote the expected utility of a consumer who agrees to a contract (D;M): We
assume that U is decreasing in both arguments. Let ￿(D;M) denote the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t from
the same contract. We assume that ￿ is increasing in D because holding ￿xed the second period
payment, a larger down payment is clearly advantageous for the ￿rm. Firm pro￿ts, however, need
not be increasing in M because a large loan size increases the probability of default. We assume
instead that ￿ ￿rst increases and then decreases in M. We assess this below in our empirical work.
Figure 3(a) depicts the iso-pro￿t line ￿(D;M) = 0, where c denotes the ￿rm￿ s cost of acquiring
the car so that ￿(c;0) is on the zero-pro￿t curve. An immediate observation is that moral hazard
may imply loan limits. As we have illustrated the situation, no ￿rm would write a contract that
involves a down payment below d0 regardless of the required second period payment. Therefore,
given a car price p ￿ c, loans will certainly be capped at p ￿ d0.
The competitive outcome in this setting is the contract that maximizes customer utility subject
to ￿rms making non-negative pro￿ts. This contract is denoted by the point E in Figure 3(a).
19There are many ways to motivate this assumption. One is that the customer￿ s second period income is stochastic
and she may not have enough money to pay back the loan. Another is that the value of the car evolves stochastically
and the customer may choose to default if its value of paying falls below the loan liability.
20If one views default as a mechanical consequence of circumstances rather than as a considered choice, moral
hazard is arguably not the best label, but this appears to be the standard terminology in the literature.
16An interesting question is how this outcome might arise in practice. One possibility is that ￿rms
allow customers to choose any point on the zero-pro￿t locus (i.e. the curve AEB), with customers
choosing the optimal point E. The interest rate on small changes in loan size is described by the
tangents of AEB, so this outcome involves ￿rms pricing cars at cost, requiring a minimum down
payment d0, and charging lower interest rates to customers who make larger down payments and
take smaller loans.
We noted earlier that interest rate caps appear to constrain subprime lenders. In the current
setting, interest rate caps may not a⁄ect the competitive allocation, but they can have a dramatic
e⁄ect on its implementation. If the seller sets p = c and o⁄ers the competitive contract E, the
contractual interest rate is given by the slope of the line between A and E. The seller can also
o⁄er E by charging p > c and lowering the interest rate. Such an o⁄er is depicted in Figure 3(b)
by the line EF. This o⁄er necessarily leads to a higher minimum payment requirement, equal to
d. If customers were allowed to borrow more than p ￿ d at the capped rate, they would, and ￿rms
would lose money.
So far we have seen that even if consumers are homogeneous and lending is competitive, moral
hazard can give rise to minimum down payments and interest rate caps can tighten these require-
ments. We now show that consumer heterogeneity and adverse selection can lead to still tighter
restrictions. To introduce heterogeneity in the simplest way, suppose there are two types of cus-
tomers, low and high risks. Denote their utility functions by UL(D;M) and UH(D;M). We assume
that high risk consumers are more likely to default for any given loan size, and because of this have
a greater desire to backload payments.
This is depicted in Figure 3(c). Following the discussion, we have drawn the utility iso-quants
so that the high-risk customers have a higher marginal rate of substitution between future and
present payments ￿ their iso-quants are steeper than those of low risk customers. The result is
adverse selection: given a set of ￿nancing choices, high-risk customers select smaller down payments
and larger loans. In the ￿gure, we have drawn the o⁄er curve as the set of contracts (D;M) that
would yield zero pro￿t to a ￿rm if the contract were to attract a representative mix of high and
low risks. These contracts are not, however, o⁄ered in equilibrium.
Figure 3(d) depicts a separating equilibrium with heterogenous customers.21 The two iso-pro￿t
21Depending on the parameters, a separating equilibrium may not always exist. One possibility is that the terms
required by ￿rms are simply too onerous for consumers. Another possibility is that the equilibrium can be upset by a
￿rm that o⁄ers a pro￿table pooling contract. The intuition for the latter is the same as in the well-studied insurance
17lines depict the locus of points that give ￿rms zero pro￿ts assuming their customers are either all
low-risk or all high-risk. The zero pro￿t curve for high risk types lies to the right of that for low
risk types because ￿xing a loan liability M, a high risk consumer will be less likely to repay. Just
as no ￿rm would contract with a low risk consumer without requiring at least a down payment d0,
no ￿rm would transact with a high risk customer without requiring at least a down payment d00.
In the absence of credit scoring, ￿rms must o⁄er the same options to low and high risk types,
who self-select into di⁄erent contracts in equilibrium. High risk customers get their preferred
allocation subject to the constraint that ￿rms make zero pro￿ts. This point is denoted by H.
Low risk customers get their preferred allocation subject to the constraint that ￿rms break even
and also that high risk customers prefer the allocation H to the contract intended for low-risk
types. We denote this point by G. Note that in equilibrium, self-selection leads to a negative
correlation between down payment and default rate. We examine this prediction below in our
empirical analysis.
There are many ￿nancing o⁄ers that support the separating allocation, but a natural possibility
in the presence of interest rate caps is that ￿rms price cars at p > c and require a down payment of
at least dH. The minimum down payment allows a customer to borrow at the capped interest rate;
a customer who makes a larger down payment receives a lower interest rate, so that both G and H
are possible. Note that the possibility of adverse selection substantially constrains the equilibrium
loan size for low-risk buyers. Rather than being able to purchase with only a down payment d,
low-risk customers must make down payments of dL > d to distinguish themselves from high-risk
customers.
The development of credit scoring has important consequences when customers are heterogenous
in their underlying default risk. Suppose that ￿rms can distinguish between risk types and price
accordingly. The resulting allocation for high risks is the same, but low risks receive their optimal
allocation E, i.e. they are allowed to take larger loans. As we have drawn it, low risk customers
actually take larger loans than high risk customers once credit scoring is in e⁄ect, in direct contrast
to self-selection that occurs given a common set of choices. More robustly, in the presence of credit
scoring, the correlation between loan size and default rate will be lower if one doesn￿ t condition on
risk group than if one does. We return to this point in our empirical analysis.
framework of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
185 Information Asymmetries and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence
The preceding section developed a simple equilibrium model of the credit market we study. The
model relies on certain assumptions regarding consumer behavior, speci￿cally moral hazard and
adverse selection, and generates several qualitative predictions. Our goal in this section is to assess
the empirical validity of the assumptions and predictions of the theory and to quantify the relative
magnitude of various forces. To this end, we document the following:
A. Moral hazard: For a given individual, the probability of default increases substantially with
loan size. As a result, expected loan payments are not monotone in loan size.
B. Adverse selection: Individuals who are more likely to default demand larger loans. This e⁄ect
operates through both predictable default risk and idiosyncratic default risk that is known to
the individuals but cannot be predicted using characteristics observed by the ￿rm.22
C. Lender response: Loan sizes are capped using minimum down requirements, which are tighter
for individuals with higher default risk. Interest rates are more favorable for individuals who
are observably lower risks or who signal their lower risk by making a larger down payment.
D. E⁄ect of credit scoring: Risk-based pricing mitigates some of the adverse selection problem
described above, and reduces the positive correlation between loan size and default.
We address these points somewhat out of order. We start by estimating a simple down payment
(equivalently, loan demand) model for a customer who has decided to purchase a car. Our estimates
indicate a force toward adverse selection: high risk buyers systematically prefer to make smaller
down payments. Having established this pattern, we specify a model of default behavior and explain
how such a model, in conjunction with the loan demand model, can be used to separately quantify
the e⁄ects of moral hazard and adverse selection. Such a separation is not immediate because the
main empirical implication of moral hazard and adverse selection is the same: a positive relationship
between loan size and default. Nevertheless, we are able to show that moral hazard is responsible for
around sixty percent of the (large) within credit category correlation between loan size and default.
Finally, we document the lender responses described above and show that adverse selection would
22The mechanism that leads to adverse selection may either operate through a causal e⁄ect ￿individuals know
they will default and therefore pay less up-front ￿or through a statistical relationship ￿individuals who have less
liquidity today for down payment also have less liquidity later, which is why they default. We can remain agnostic
as to which of these mechanisms is more important, as it has no e⁄ect on our analysis.
19be substantially worse if risk-based pricing did not force the highest risk buyers to make the largest
down payments.
5.1 Adverse Selection and the Demand for Loans
We begin by studying the ￿nancing decisions of car buyers. Consider a buyer who faces a minimum
down payment di. By making a larger down payment, the buyer reduces her loan size and, as
we discuss below, may receive a lower interest rate. So she faces a trade-o⁄ between a lower
immediate payment and higher future payments. We want to understand how this trade-o⁄ is
resolved depending on the buyer￿ s risk characteristics, as well as her liquidity characteristics, the
value of the car, and so on.













This model equivalently characterizes the choice of loan size Li = minfpi ￿ di;pi ￿ (x0
i￿ + "i)g, so
we will speak of loan demand and down payment choice interchangeably.
For obvious reasons, we observe only the down payments, and later loan repayments, of pur-
chasers. For our present purpose, however, we don￿ t think that selection is a major concern. First,
we have extremely detailed individual data and su¢ cient observations to include controls for city,
year and month of purchase, so we can control for most factors that a⁄ect both purchasing and bor-
rowing behavior. Second, we are primarily interested in the e⁄ect of price rather than of minimum
down payment. In light of the extremely low sensitivity of purchasing to price, as documented in
Section 3, we believe that the main e⁄ect of price is on the ￿nancing terms of purchasers rather
than their composition.
In estimating the down payment model, we include as controls all of the variables in our model
of purchasing ￿ car characteristics, individual characteristics including credit category and controls
for city, year and month of purchase. We also include the minimum down payment as a control
variable, so that it enters both as a driver of down payment and as a constraint. In a textbook
consumption-savings model, the minimum down payment would a⁄ect Di but not D￿
i. In our
setting, however, there are two reasons it might have a direct e⁄ect. One is selection: a higher
required down payment may cause some liquidity-constrained buyers not to purchase. The other
20is that the minimum down payment may ￿anchor￿ the buyer￿ s decision process by providing a
starting point for thinking about how much to pay down and how much to borrow.
Table 3 presents our estimates, which are consistent with both common sense and the importance
of liquidity constraints. Notably, a price increase of 100 dollars has a relatively small e⁄ect on the
desired down payment (between 4 to 20 dollars depending on the exact speci￿cation). That is, the
primary response to a higher price is to take a larger loan. A higher minimum down payment and a
higher starting interest rate are also associated with larger desired down payments. Although they
are not reported in the table, the monthly dummies for tax season are large and highly signi￿cant.
As noted earlier, desired down payments are 301 dollars higher in February than in the other eleven
months.
The most striking results in Table 3 concern the relationship between desired down payments
and observable risk characteristics. High risk buyers systematically prefer to make smaller down
payments. Our estimates imply that, all else equal, the ideal down payment of a buyer in the
worst credit category is 28 percent less than that of a buyer in the best credit category. The same
relationship holds to some extent within credit categories. For instance, among the buyers with a
given credit category, those with lower raw credit scores choose larger loans. There is also a similar
pattern across cars. Buyers who have selected newer and more valuable cars, which are presumably
less likely to break down, make larger down payments. These ￿ndings all indicate a tendency for
adverse selection, our point B above. A key point we address below is that these estimates need
not translate directly into realized adverse selection because, just as in the theory, observably high
risk buyers face higher minimum down requirements.
5.2 Identifying Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection from Default Behavior
We now turn our attention to loan repayment, or default behavior. We start by specifying an
empirical model of default. For this purpose, we use a Cox proportional hazard model. The model
is convenient both because it allows for a ￿ exible default pattern over time and because it allows
us to work with our full sample of loans despite some observations being censored. Recall that in







21In the usual formulation, t is time, but here we specify t as the fraction of the loan payments
made, extending from t = 0 when the loan initiates to t = 1 when the loan is fully repaid. This
transformation provides a simple way to account for the fact that the term of the loan varies
somewhat across borrowers in our sample. The remainder of the model is straightforward: xi is
a vector of individual and car characteristics, as well as ￿nancing terms such as loan size, interest
rate and loan term, ￿ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and the baseline hazard h0(t) is
an arbitrary function. The model￿ s main assumption is that changes in covariates shift the hazard
rate proportionally without otherwise a⁄ecting the pattern of default. This is a strong assumption,
but in our case appears to be fairly innocuous; we have experimented extensively with alternative
speci￿cations, always with similar conclusions.23
We use the default model to address the central empirical implication of the theory, the rela-
tionship between default and loan size. Both moral hazard and adverse selection imply a positive
cross-sectional correlation between these variables conditional on priced characteristics. Moral haz-
ard yields a correlation because an individual buyer￿ s probability of default increases with loan
size. Adverse selection does so because buyers who anticipate default take larger loans. We saw
earlier that it is precisely the positive correlation between loan size and default that leads to credit
limits. For this reason, identifying a correlation is itself a useful goal. Ideally, however, one wants
to disentangle the e⁄ects of moral hazard and adverse selection, in part because the institutions
for overcoming them are so di⁄erent. Credit scoring and risk-based pricing can mitigate adverse
selection, while tools such as improved collection or dynamic incentives are needed to address moral
hazard.
How does one separately identify moral hazard and adverse selection in our setting? The most
obvious speci￿cation of the default model is to view the probability of default as a function of loan
size and other observable default drivers, such as the interest rate, the loan term and individual
and car characteristics. The estimated coe¢ cient on loan size will then pool the causal e⁄ect of
having a larger loan on the probability of default (i.e. moral hazard) with the correlation induced
by observably equivalent borrowers, who nevertheless face di⁄erent risks, taking di⁄erent loans (i.e.
23This is to be expected given the striking similarity in the timing of default patterns across di⁄erent risk groups,
as shown in Figure 1(a). For instance, we get similar results using probit or logit models of default, estimated either
using the uncensored loans in our data or using all loans with the dependent variable being a dummy equal to one
if the loan defaults in the ￿rst quarter of the loan term. We have also experimented with default models where the
cumulative distribution of defaults, rather than the hazard, is separable in duration and covariates, and with using
calendar time rather than the fraction of payments as the dependent variable.
22adverse selection). To isolate moral hazard, therefore, we need to fully control for factors that a⁄ect
both loan size and default. And despite our rich individual level controls, buyers may have private
information at the time of purchase that a⁄ects both their down payment and their later default
behavior. Our solution is to use the estimated residual from the down payment model as a control
variable in estimating the default model.
We ￿rst construct the down payment residual from the Tobit model in the last section. We
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For buyers who pay more than the required minimum, we observe the residual di￿x0
i^ ￿ exactly. For
buyers who pay the minimum, we have an upper bound and take the conditional expectation. The
constructed residual ￿i contains the buyer￿ s private information as pertains to her choice of down
payment and hence loan size.
To identify moral hazard, we include the down payment residual in the default model along with
the relevant observed individual characteristics. Recall that loan size is equal to the car price (plus
taxes and fees) minus the down payment. Once we control for the determinants of down payment,
the remaining variation in loan size is driven entirely by variation in car price. Therefore, under
the assumption that car price is independent of default risk conditional on all of the observed
individual characteristics and the unobserved characteristics re￿ ected in the down payment, the
estimated coe¢ cient on loan size will represent the causal e⁄ect of loan size on default.
Note that the logic of the approach is simply to isolate variation in loan size that is independent
of default risk conditional on our controls. While the idea is straightforward, we can think of several
potential concerns. One is that the variation in car price may not translate into su¢ cient variation
in loan size. This concern is mitigated by our earlier estimate that changes in price translate almost
directly into changes in loan size. A second concern is that the negotiated price may incorporate
information about default risk that we do not observe directly and that is not re￿ ected in the choice
of down payment. Presumably, this would be information available to the salesperson but not to
headquarters or the borrower herself. This concern does not seem to be empirically important.24 A
24One way to address this is to focus on variation in list price, by applying again the instrumental variable strategy
we use in Section 3, where the list price is used as an instrument for the transaction price. The results from such
speci￿cations were very similar to the results reported in Table 3. We should note that because applying instrumental
23￿nal concern is that binding minimum down payments will prevent us from accurately recovering
borrower￿ s private information. To address this, we used the fact that a fraction of buyers who
make the minimum down payment also choose to defer a fraction of it. We estimated a probit
model for this deferral decision and constructed a second residual using the same method as above.
Our idea here was that if the truncation prevented us from recovering all of the relevant private
information, the deferral decision would contain additional information. It turns out, however, that
including this additional residual has essentially no e⁄ect on our estimate of moral hazard.
Our control variable approach also provides a simple test for whether there is adverse selection
on characteristics about which the parties are asymmetrically informed at the time of purchase.
The argument is the following. Conditional on loan size, a borrower￿ s down payment is sunk; it
should not directly a⁄ect default. But it should also re￿ ect all the buyer￿ s relevant information
about default at the time of purchase. Therefore, a negative correlation between the down pay-
ment residual and the probability of default, conditional on loan size and observed characteristics,
indicates that buyers who made higher down payments for unobservable reasons are also those who
are more likely to default for unobservable reasons. This is precisely the notion of adverse selection
arising from asymmetric information about default risk.
Finally, a straightforward extension of our approach allows us not just to test for adverse
selection but to quantify the degree of self-selection on di⁄erent dimensions. To do this, we use the
proportional hazard model to estimate correlations between loan size and default rate conditioning
on increasingly sparse subsets of individual characteristics. When we include the full set of controls,
the coe¢ cient on loan size gives the pure moral hazard e⁄ect of loan size on default. Omitting the
down payment residual ￿ from the set of controls, the estimated coe¢ cient on loan size pools the
moral hazard e⁄ect and the correlation between loan size and default that is driven by observably
identical buyers self-selecting into di⁄erent loan sizes. By subtracting o⁄ the estimated moral
hazard e⁄ect, we obtain an estimate of the latter.
This idea extends further. If we omit observed buyer characteristics that are not directly priced,
the estimated loan coe¢ cient pools in the correlation that is driven by buyers who are observably
di⁄erent but face the same prices selecting di⁄erent loan sizes. This allows us to assess the amount
of adverse selection that is present under the existing pricing scheme. Finally, by dropping even
variables in a Cox hazard model is complex, and would involve additional assumptions, we rely in this robustness
analysis on linear and tobit duration models.
24controls for credit category, we can assess a key prediction of the theoretical model, that the use of
risk-based pricing lowers the cross-sectional correlation between loan size and default.
Some readers may ￿nd it useful to relate our approach to the empirical literature on insurance
markets, which recently has focused on similar issues. This literature uses the observed correlation
between insurance coverage and insurance claims (the insurance analogues of loan size and default)
to provide evidence that a market is or isn￿ t characterized by some combination of moral hazard
and adverse selection (e.g., Chiappori and Salanie, 2001). Often, however, the argument is made
that the two forces cannot be separately identi￿ed. The reason we can separate moral hazard
from adverse selection in our setting is that we have two sources of variation in the loan size. The
￿rst, which accounts for adverse selection, is the buyer￿ s endogenous choice of down payment. The
second, which accounts for moral hazard, is exogenous price variation. In the insurance setting,
the corresponding variation would come from observing both endogenous choices of coverage and
exogenous changes in the menu of coverage options.
5.3 Estimates of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
We report our estimates of the proportional hazard default model in Table 4. The ￿rst column
reports the richest speci￿cation, including the full set of observable characteristics and the estimated
down payment residual as controls. This speci￿cation isolates the e⁄ect of moral hazard in the
coe¢ cient on loan size and also contains our test for adverse selection arising from asymmetric
information. The other columns report simpler speci￿cations as discussed above. All display a
large and signi￿cant positive relationship between loan size and default.
Our estimate of the causal e⁄ect of loan size on default indicates that a 1,000 dollar larger loan
leads to a 16 percent higher default rate. This estimate is robust to using richer speci￿cations. In
particular, the estimated coe¢ cient on loan size varies by less than one percent when we include
higher order polynomials of the estimated residual or the additional control variable constructed
from the choice of whether to defer part of the down payment.
The estimated model implies that the expected revenue from loan payments does not increase
monotonically in loan size. To capture this, we ￿x all variables other than loan size and credit
category at their sample means and use the default model to calculate expected loan revenue as a
function of loan size for each credit category. We plot the relationship in Figure 4(a). Depending
on the risk group, expected loan payments peak at loan sizes of between ten and twelve thousand
25dollars. Though it may not be immediately apparent, this ￿gure (rotated 90 degrees) is essentially
the empirical analogue to the iso-pro￿t lines for lending to di⁄erent risk groups that are depicted
in Figure 3(d). The main point in both ￿gures is that marginal dollars loaned eventually become
unpro￿table and this occurs sooner for high risk borrowers.
While we focus primarily on loan size, we also ￿nd interesting e⁄ects arising from variation in
the other ￿nancing terms. Both loans with higher interest rates and those with longer terms are
more likely to default. The former is easy to understand. A higher interest rate implies that for a
given loan size, monthly payments are higher. Consistent with moral hazard, we estimate that a
one point increase in the annual interest rate increases default by 2.3 percent, a substantial e⁄ect.
A longer loan term need not have an obvious e⁄ect on default. On the one hand, a longer loan term
lowers the size of each monthly payment. On the other hand, it stretches the repayment period,
potentially allowing more default-generating events to happen within the duration of the loan. Our
estimates suggest that the latter is the more relevant. In particular, a one month increase in loan
term increases the default rate by 1.5 percent.
Observable buyer characteristics also signi￿cantly a⁄ect default rates. Credit categories in
particular have remarkable power in predicting default. Buyers classi￿ed as high risks are more
than twice more likely to default than buyers classi￿ed as low risks, with medium risk buyers in
between. Within credit category, buyers who have higher incomes, have bank accounts, do not live
with their parents and have higher raw credit scores are all less likely to default. As we discuss
below, however, the fact that these characteristics predict default and are not directly priced does
not necessarily imply a serious adverse selection problem in ￿nancing choices. Indeed, self-selection
on some observed characteristics is advantageous rather than adverse. For example, buyers who
live with their parents tend to make larger down payments but have a greater likelihood of default
later on.
The last variable of interest is the down payment residual. As discussed above, our test for
adverse selection due to asymmetric information is based on the conditional correlation between
this constructed variable and the default rate. The estimated correlation is negative and highly
signi￿cant, consistent with the presence of adverse selection.
The second column of Table 4 drops the down payment residual, our control for privately known
borrower characteristics. Without this control, the coe¢ cient on loan size combines both the moral
hazard e⁄ect of loan size on default and the cross-sectional correlation due to borrowers who are
26at higher risk of default for privately known reasons taking larger loans. Here we ￿nd that a 1,000
dollar larger loan is associated with a 24 percent higher rate of default. We estimated that 16
percentage points were due to moral hazard, leaving adverse selection on unobservables to explain
the other eight. Roughly speaking, this implies that moral hazard is nearly twice as important
from the lender￿ s perspective than ex ante asymmetric information about default risk.
In the third column of Table 4, we omit the individual characteristics that are not directly
priced, so that the coe¢ cient on loan size pools the moral hazard e⁄ect with self-selection on both
unobserved and observed but unpriced individual characteristics. Our estimate of the relationship
between loan size and default di⁄ers minimally from the prior column. This indicates that to the
extent that ￿nancing choices within credit category are characterized by adverse selection, the e⁄ect
is almost totally due to selection on unobservables. It also suggests that credit categories, despite
being coarse indicator of individual risk, nevertheless capture much of the predictable variation in
default risk, or at least much of the predictable correlation between loan demand and default risk.
The ￿nal column of Table 4 does not control even for credit category so that the coe¢ cient on
loan size includes the correlation across credit categories as well as within credit categories. This
change leads to a signi￿cant decline in the coe¢ cient on loan size: the unconditional e⁄ect of loan
size on default is 19 percent, compared to 23 percent when credit categories are included. This is
evidence of point D from the beginning of this section: risk-based pricing forces riskier individuals,
who given the same options would make smaller down payments, to pay more down, mitigating the
potential for adverse selection. We explore this point in detail next.
5.4 Minimum Down Payments and Risk-Based Pricing
Our theoretical model emphasized several equilibrium responses to moral hazard and adverse se-
lection. One was minimum down payment requirements, meaning that su¢ ciently risky buyers
would not be allowed to ￿nance their entire car purchase. This pattern is clear in our data. Even
buyers with the highest possible credit category face a positive down payment requirement. And
risky buyers can face minimum down payments on the order of 1,500 to 2,000 dollars ￿ i.e., 25-30
percent of the cost of the car.
The remaining equilibrium predictions concern risk-based pricing. Risk-based pricing can take
two forms: better ￿nancing terms for observably lower risks and better ￿nancing terms for buyers
who e⁄ectively signal their lower risk. We observe both in our data. To display them graphically,
27Figure 4(b) plots empirical ￿o⁄er curves￿ at a particular set of dealerships during a particular
period in our data (the choice is somewhat arbitrary). The horizontal axis represents the down
payment and the vertical axis the loan liability, that is loan principal plus future interest payments.
There are four curves, corresponding to di⁄erent buyer categories and di⁄erent car prices. As the
picture shows, interest rates decrease with the down payment ￿each o⁄er curve is convex rather
than linear. The decrease, however, is fairly small and made smaller in practice because few buyers
make down payments far above the minimum. The more substantive form of risk-based pricing is
therefore di⁄erences in minimum payments across categories. In Figure 4(b) for instance, buyers
classi￿ed as high risk cannot put down less than 1,400 dollars, while buyers classi￿ed as low risk
can put down as little as 400.
We have already suggested that risk-based minimum payments play a substantial role in miti-
gating adverse selection in ￿nancing choices, exactly as predicted by the theory. To crystallize this
point, we re-estimated both default rates and desired loan sizes as a function of credit category,
controlling for car and contract characteristics but omitting the remaining buyer characteristics
such as income and age. These estimates imply that for an average car priced at an average price,
buyers classi￿ed as the best risk category desire to make a 723 dollar down payment while buyers
classi￿ed as the worst credit category desire to make a 517 dollar down payment, a di⁄erence of 206
dollars (29 percent). Moreover, conditional on both groups making an average down payment, 24
percent of the buyers in the lowest risk category will default compared to 64 percent of the buyers
in the highest credit category.
Figure 5(a) plots the results of these calculations, with the size of each dot representing the
frequency of each credit category in the borrower population. What the ￿gure indicates is a strong
propensity for risky borrowers to self-select into smaller down payments. In the model, one e⁄ect
of risk-based minimum payments is to prevent this, which is precisely what we observe in the data.
In particular, Figure 5(b) plots the same default rates against the minimum of the desired loan
size and the average loan limit for each category. As the picture makes clear, high risk buyers are
heavily constrained by loan caps relative to low risk buyers. Indeed, once risk-based loan caps are
factored in, the overall correlation between loan size and default is negative (the picture makes it
clear that the relationship is in fact non-monotone). Consistent with the model, and our results
above, the e⁄ective use of credit scoring forces riskier buyers to make larger up-front payments,
mitigating adverse selection.
28We have focused on the role that risk-based pricing plays in ￿nancing decisions, but it plays
another role as well. Because purchase decisions are sensitive to required down payments, raising
the minimum down payment screens out some applicants. To the extent that these applicants are
ex post more likely to default, the e⁄ect of risk-based pricing on the purchasing dimension may be
at least as large as on the ￿nancing dimension. This e⁄ect, however, is more di¢ cult to quantify
because it requires one to estimate a joint distribution of purchase and default probabilities, and
to overcome the fact that the ￿nancing and repayment are not observed for non-purchasers. We
tackle these problems in ongoing work.
6 Conclusion
The notion that consumers may be liquidity constrained is an important theme in recent research
on consumption, taxation, and social insurance. Our results provide fresh evidence on the role
of liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, at least for people at the lower end of the income
distribution. We view our primary contribution, however, as providing a snapshot of low-income
credit markets, and especially of the informational problems that might characterize these markets
and give rise to liquidity constraints. In particular, we have highlighted the substantial moral hazard
and adverse selection problems faced by lenders serving the subprime population. Interestingly, it
appears that modern credit scoring can go a signi￿cant distance toward mitigating adverse selection
problems in the credit market, suggesting that innovations in this area may be an important cause
of the rise of subprime lending that has occurred over the last decade. Such credit scoring is less
likely to mitigate moral hazard problems, still restricting credit to subprime borrowers.
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31Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95%
Applicant Characteristics (N >> 50,000)*
   Age 32.8 10.7 19 53
   Monthly Income 2,414 1,074 1,299 4,500
   Home Owner 0.15 - - -
   Live With Parents 0.18 - - -
   Bank Account 0.72 - - -
   Car Purchased 0.34 - - -
Car Characteristics
   Acquisition Cost 5,090 1,329 3,140 7,075
   Total Cost 6,096 1,372 4,096 8,212
   Car Age (years) 4.3 1.9 2.0 8.0
   Odometer 68,775 22,091 31,179 102,299
   Lot Age (days) 33 44 1 122
   Car Price 10,777 1,797 8,095 13,595
Transaction Characteristics
   Min. Down Payment (buyers) 648 276 400 1,200
   Min. Down Payment (applicants) 750 335 400 1,400
   Interest Rate (APR) 26.2 4.4 17.7 29.9
   Loan Term (months) 40.5 3.7 35.0 45.0
   Down Payment 942 599 400 2,000
   Loan Amount 10,740 1,801 7,982 13,559
   Monthly Payment 398 78 309 470
   Default (uncensored obs. only) 0.61 - - -
   Recovery Amount (all defaults) 1,870 1,697 0 4,818
Low Risk Med Risk High Risk
Applicant and Buyer Credit Grades
   Applicants 0.26 0.45 0.29
   Buyers 0.35 0.47 0.17
* To preserve the confidentiality of the company that provided the data, we do not
   report the exact number of applications.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
32Table 2: Probit Estimates of Individual-Level Purchasing
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if sale
(1) (2) (3)
dF/dx Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err.
Offer Variables
List Price ($100s) - - - - -0.0016 (0.0002)
   Negotiated Price ($100s) -0.0008 (0.0001) -0.0034 (0.0005) - -
   Minimum Down ($100s) -0.0305 (0.0006) -0.0301 (0.0005) -0.0305 (0.0006)
   Maximum Interest Rate (APR) -0.0011 (0.0004) -0.0019 (0.0005) -0.0009 (0.0004)
   Term (months) 0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0024 (0.0008) 0.0007 (0.0003)
Car Characteristics
   Car Cost ($100s) 0.0005 (0.0002) 0.0031 (0.0012) 0.0014 (0.0002)
   Premium (Cost > $7,500) 0.0047 (0.0031) 0.0043 (0.0031) 0.0069 (0.0032)
   Car Age (years) 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0000 (0.0006)
   Odometer (10,000s) -0.0008 (0.0004) -0.0008 (0.0004) -0.0008 (0.0004)
   Lot Age (months) -0.0011 (0.0006) -0.0058 (0.0018) -0.0007 (0.0005)
Individual  Characteristics
   Income ($1,000s/month) 0.0255 (0.0007) 0.0261 (0.0008) 0.0253 (0.0007)
   Age 0.0083 (0.0004) 0.0084 (0.0005) 0.0083 (0.0004)
   Age squared -0.0001 (4.7E-06) -0.0001 (4.2E-06) -0.0001 (4.7E-06)
   Bank Account 0.0260 (0.0017) 0.0257 (0.0017) 0.0261 (0.0017)
   House Owner -0.0323 (0.0021) -0.0325 (0.0021) -0.0324 (0.0021)
   Lives with Parents 0.0091 (0.0020) 0.0091 (0.0020) 0.0090 (0.0020)
   Credit Score (100s) 0.0088 (0.0021) 0.0090 (0.0021) 0.0087 (0.0021)
Credit Category Fixed Effects
   Representative Low Risk 0.0474 (0.0077) 0.0475 (0.0074) 0.0479 (0.0077)
   Representative Medium Risk 0.0605 (0.0062) 0.0629 (0.0062) 0.0603 (0.0062)
   Representative High Risk 0.0280 (0.0047) 0.0299 (0.0047) 0.0280 (0.0047)
Other Fixed Effects Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City,
Credit Category Credit Category Credit Category
Instrument for Price - List Price -
R
2= 0.061 - R
2= 0.061
Notes
1. Sample is all applications; sample size is N >> 50,0000 (see Table 1).
2. In Column (2), instruments are list price (equal to zero if not available) and indicator equal to one if list price
     is not available. List prices are available for approximately 80 percent of the observations.
3. In Column (3), regressors are list price (equal to zero if not available) and negotiated price (equal to zero if
     list price is available). Negotiated price coefficient not reported.
33Table 3: Tobit Estimates of Down Payment
Dependent Variable: Down Payment ($100s) Conditional on Purchase
(1) (2)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Offer Variables
   Negotiated Price ($100s) 0.040 (0.004) 0.202 (0.024)
   Minimum Down ($100s) 0.427 (0.018) 0.403 (0.018)
   Maximum Interest Rate (APR) 0.207 (0.011) 0.257 (0.013)
   Term (months) -0.391 (0.009) -0.505 (0.019)
Car Characteristics
   Car Cost ($100s) 0.237 (0.004) 0.076 (0.024)
   Premium (Cost > $7,500) 3.657 (0.078) 3.641 (0.079)
   Car Age (years) 0.046 (0.016) 0.050 (0.016)
   Odometer (10,000s) -0.032 (0.012) -0.028 (0.012)
   Lot Age (months) -0.584 (0.016) -0.296 (0.044)
Individual Characteristics
   Income ($1,000s/month) -0.152 (0.019) -0.271 (0.026)
   Age -0.169 (0.010) -0.190 (0.010)
   Age squared 0.002 (1E-04) 0.002 (1E-04)
   Bank Account 0.295 (0.047) 0.344 (0.048)
   House Owner 0.248 (0.055) 0.272 (0.056)
   Lives with Parents 0.256 (0.056) 0.260 (0.056)
   Credit Score (100s) 0.225 (0.057) 0.177 (0.057)
Credit Category Fixed Effects
   Representative Low Risk 1.464 (0.227) 1.504 (0.228)
   Representative Medium Risk 1.101 (0.194) 0.968 (0.196)
   Representative High Risk 0.380 (0.167) 0.269 (0.168)
Other Fixed Effects Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City,
Credit Category Credit Category




1. Sample is all sales; sample size is ~0.34N, where N >> 50,0000 (see Table 1).
2. All results are based on a Tobit regression with actual down payment minus
     minimum down payment as the dependent variable and left-censoring at zero.
34Table 4: Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of Default
Dependent Variable: Fraction of loan payments made
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err.
Transaction characteristics
Amount Financed ($100s) 1.016 (0.001) 1.024 (0.001) 1.023 (0.001) 1.019 (0.001)
   Maximum Interest Rate (APR) 1.023 (0.002) 1.027 (0.002) 1.026 (0.002) 1.023 (0.002)
   Term (months) 1.015 (0.002) 1.006 (0.002) 1.007 (0.002) 1.008 (0.002)
Down Payment Residual 0.980 (0.001) - - - - - -
Car Characteristics
   Car Cost ($100s) 0.981 (0.001) 0.974 (0.001) 0.973 (0.001) 0.976 (0.001)
   Premium (Cost > $7,500) 0.866 (0.015) 0.888 (0.015) 0.889 (0.015) 0.819 (0.014)
   Car Age (years) 1.027 (0.003) 1.027 (0.003) 1.026 (0.003) 1.020 (0.003)
   Odometer (10,000s) 1.012 (0.002) 1.012 (0.002) 1.012 (0.002) 1.015 (0.002)
   Lot Age (months) 1.056 (0.003) 1.066 (0.003) 1.069 (0.003) 1.063 (0.003)
Individual Characteristics
   Income ($1,000s/month) 0.956 (0.004) 0.949 (0.004) - - - -
   Age 0.996 (0.002) 0.994 (0.002) - - - -
   Age squared 1.000 (2E-05) 1.000 (7E-03) - - - -
   Bank Account 0.821 (0.007) 0.826 (0.007) - - - -
   House Owner 0.999 (0.011) 1.005 (0.011) - - - -
   Lives with Parents 1.061 (0.011) 1.061 (0.011) - - - -
   Credit Score (100s) 0.978 (0.011) 0.981 (0.011) - - - -
Credit Category Fixed Effects
   Representative Low Risk 0.575 (0.014) 0.553 (0.014) 0.476 (0.011) - -
   Representative Medium Risk 0.894 (0.019) 0.862 (0.018) 0.779 (0.015) - -
   Representative High Risk 1.099 (0.024) 1.074 (0.023) 0.997 (0.021) - -
Other Fixed Effects Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City,
Credit Category Credit Category Credit Category Credit Category
Notes
1. Sample is all sales; sample size is ~0.34N, where N >> 50,0000 (see Table 1).
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0 No dependents VL Less than $1,500
1 1 dependent L $1,500 to $2,000
2 2 or more dependents M $2,000 to $3,000
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Figure 3(d): Separating Equilibrium with Adverse Selection

















































































Percentages represent percent of buyers in each credit












40Figure 5(a): Scatter Plot of Desired Down Payment






























Based on averge car price of $10,777.  Size of bubbles represents number of sales
to each credit category.  Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 5(b): Scatter Plot of Actual Down Payment


























Based on averge car price of $10,777.  Size of bubbles represents number of sales
to each credit category.  Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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